

The macroeconomic effects of oil supply news: Evidence from OPEC announcements

Diego R. Känzig

London Business School

Introduction

Motivation

- Recent turbulences in the oil market have sparked **renewed interest** in the question of how **oil prices** affect the **macroeconomy**



- Answering this question is **challenging** because
 - Oil prices are **endogenous**
 - **Not** all oil price shocks are **alike**
- The literature has focused on **oil supply** and **demand**
- Less attention has been devoted to **oil market expectations**
 - Mainly because identifying shocks to expectations is **difficult**

- Propose a novel approach to identify a shock to **oil supply expectations**, exploiting **institutional features of OPEC** and **high-frequency data**
 - Isolate **exogenous** variation in oil price by looking at how oil futures prices change around *OPEC announcements*
 - Use as an *instrument* in an oil market VAR to identify oil market shock
- Shock is best thought of as a **news shock** about future **oil supply**

Preview of results

- **Oil supply news** leads to an *immediate* increase in **oil prices**, a *gradual* fall in **oil production**, a significant *increase* in **oil inventories** and a fall in **global activity**
- This has consequences for the **US economy**: **industrial production** falls and **consumer prices** rise significantly
- Also leads to higher **inflation expectations** and a depreciation of the **dollar** but has no effect on **uncertainty**

Related literature

- **Macroeconomic effects of oil market shocks:** Hamilton (2003); Kilian (2009); Baumeister and Peersman (2013); Kilian and Murphy (2012, 2014); Juvenal and Petrella (2015); Antolín-Díaz and Rubio-Ramírez (2018); Caldara, Cavallo, and Iacoviello (2019); Baumeister and Hamilton (2019)
- **High-frequency identification of MP shocks:** Kuttner (2001); Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005); Gertler and Karadi (2015); Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)
- **Event studies on OPEC announcements:** Draper (1984); Loderer (1985); Demirer and Kutan (2010); Lin and Tamvakis (2010), Loutia, Mellios, and Andriosopoulos (2016)
- **News and business cycles:** Barsky and Sims (2011); Beaudry and Portier (2014); Ramey (2011); Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2013); Arezki, Ramey, and Sheng (2017); Gambetti and Moretti (2017)

Identification

Identification

- Oil market has a *peculiar* structure
 - Market dominated by big player, **OPEC**, that reveals **information** about **future supply** in **lumpy** way
 - Very **liquid** futures markets for oil

▶ Details

- This motivates the use of **high-frequency identification** techniques
- **Idea:** Identify **oil supply surprises** from changes in oil futures prices in tight window around OPEC announcements
- Similar to high-frequency identification of *monetary policy shocks*

OPEC announcement

Having reviewed the oil market outlook, including the overall demand/supply expectations for the year 2007, in particular the first and second quarters, as well as the outlook for the oil market in the medium term, the Conference observed that market fundamentals clearly indicate that there is more than ample crude supply, high stock levels and increasing spare capacity. [...]

*In view of the above, the Conference decided to reduce OPEC production by a further 500,000 b/d, with effect from **1 February 2007**, in order to balance supply and demand.*

Source: Announcement from the 143rd meeting of the OPEC conference (14 Dec 2006)

Example cont.

Market reaction




Figure 1: Oil futures prices (1-month WTI crude) around announcement on 14 December 2006

Construction of oil supply surprises

- Collected **OPEC press releases** for the period 1983-2017
 - Total of **119 announcements**
- Compute **oil supply surprises**:

$$Surprise_{t,d}^h = F_{t+h,d} - F_{t+h,d-1},$$

where $F_{t+h,d}$ is log settlement price of h -month ahead WTI crude contract on announcement day d in month t

- Aggregate surprises to **monthly** series

$$Surprise_t^h = \begin{cases} Surprise_{t,d}^h & \text{if one announcement} \\ \sum_i Surprise_{t,d_i}^h & \text{if multiple announcements} \\ 0 & \text{if no announcements} \end{cases}$$

Construction of oil supply surprises

- **Key assumptions:**
 - **Announcements** *only* contain information about **future supply**
 - **Risk premia** are *constant* over window
- ⇒ Surprise series captures *changes in expectations* driven by **news** about **future supply**
- **Important choice: maturity** of the contract, h
 - To sharpen interpretation of news shock about **future supply**, use **6-month** contract as benchmark
 - Results are *robust* to other choices

Oil supply surprise series




Figure 2: Oil supply surprise series constructed from changes in oil futures prices (principal component spanning first year of WTI crude term structure) around OPEC announcements

Oil supply surprise series

- **Accords well** with narrative accounts on **historical episodes**
- **No** evidence for autocorrelation
- **Not** forecastable by macroeconomic or financial variables
- **Uncorrelated** with measures of **other structural shocks** (e.g. global demand or uncertainty shocks)

▸ Properties

Background noise

- Trade-off between capturing entire response to announcement and other confounding news
- Daily surprises could be subject to background noise




Figure 3: Announcement versus control days

- Variance on OPEC days significantly **larger**

Econometric framework

- **Oil supply surprise series** has **good properties** but is likely only imperfect shock measure
- **Solution:** use the series as an **instrument** in proxy VAR to identify **oil supply news shock**
 - Allows for *measurement error* in the instrument
 - Can trace out responses of financial and macro variables jointly

- Structural VAR

$$y_t = b + B_1 y_{t-1} + \dots + B_p y_{t-p} + S \varepsilon_t, \quad \varepsilon_t \sim N(0, \Omega)$$

- Identification based on **external instruments** (Stock and Watson, 2012; Mertens and Ravn, 2013)
 - **External instrument:** variable *correlated* with the **shock of interest** but *not* with the **other shocks**

$$\mathbb{E}[z_t \varepsilon_{1,t}] = \alpha \neq 0 \quad (\text{Relevance})$$

$$\mathbb{E}[z_t \varepsilon_{2:n,t}] = 0, \quad (\text{Exogeneity})$$

- Use **oil supply surprise series**, $Surprise_t^h$, as *external instrument*, z_t , for **oil price**

Model specification

- y_t includes real oil price, world oil production, world oil inventories, world industrial production, US IP, US CPI
- Estimation sample: 1974M1-2017M12
- Identification sample: 1983M2-2017M12
- VAR is estimated in (log) levels
- Lag order: $p = 12$

▶ Data

Results


Table 1: Strength of the instrument

| | 1M | 2M | 3M | 6M | 9M | 12M | COMP |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Coefficient | 0.946 | 0.981 | 1.016 | 1.070 | 1.123 | 1.098 | 1.085 |
| F-stat | 24.37 | 24.25 | 24.33 | 22.90 | 22.35 | 13.58 | 22.67 |
| F-stat (robust) | 12.01 | 11.86 | 11.92 | 11.32 | 11.11 | 7.49 | 10.55 |
| R^2 | 4.53 | 4.51 | 4.52 | 4.27 | 4.17 | 2.57 | 4.22 |
| R^2 (adjusted) | 4.34 | 4.32 | 4.33 | 4.08 | 3.98 | 2.38 | 4.04 |
| Observations | 516 | 516 | 516 | 516 | 516 | 516 | 516 |

Notes: First-stage regressions of oil price residual on proxies. F-stats above 10 indicate strong instruments.

- High-frequency surprises are **strong instruments** for oil price

Baseline results



First stage regression: F: 22.67, robust F: 10.55, R^2 : 4.22%, Adjusted R^2 : 4.04%

Figure 4: IRFs to oil supply news shock (one sd). Dashed lines are 90% CIs.

Baseline results

- Shock leads to a large, **immediate increase** in oil prices, **sluggish fall** in oil production and significant **increase** in oil inventories
⇒ **consistent** with interpretation of a **news shock** about oil supply
- Global activity falls persistently
- This has consequences for the **U.S. economy**:
 - Industrial production **falls** and consumer prices **rise** significantly
- Changes in **oil supply expectations** have **powerful effects** even if current oil production does not move

Historical decomposition




Figure 5: Historical decomposition. Dashed lines are 90% CIs.

- **Oil supply news** have contributed meaningfully to **historical variations** in oil price
- Events in the Middle East affect the oil price not only through *current* supply but also changes in **supply expectations**

Propagation channels

- To get a **better understanding** on **how** the **shock propagates**, study the effects on a **wide range** of financial and macroeconomic variables
- Implemented by augmenting baseline VAR by one variable at a time and computing impulse response

Oil supply news lead to

- higher oil price and inflation expectations, but do not affect uncertainty
- higher consumer prices, even after excluding energy
- lower economic activity, broadly defined
- depreciation of dollar and deterioration of terms of trade and trade balance

News versus uncertainty




Figure 6: Expectations and uncertainty measures [▶ More](#)

Oil supply news lead to

- higher oil price and inflation expectations, but do not affect uncertainty
- higher consumer prices, even after excluding energy
- lower economic activity, broadly defined
- depreciation of dollar and deterioration of terms of trade and trade balance





Figure 7: Core CPI and CPI components

Oil supply news lead to


- higher oil price and inflation expectations, but do not affect uncertainty
- higher consumer prices, even after excluding energy
- lower economic activity, broadly defined
- depreciation of dollar and deterioration of terms of trade and trade balance

Economic activity

Panel A: Monthly indicators



Panel B: Quarterly indicators



Oil supply news lead to

- higher oil price and inflation expectations, but do not affect uncertainty
- higher consumer prices, even after excluding energy
- lower economic activity, broadly defined
- depreciation of dollar and deterioration of terms of trade and trade balance

Exchange rates and trade




Figure 10: Exchange rates and trade

Perform a battery of robustness tests

- **Identification:** Background noise, informationally robust instrument, futures contract, announcement type, two-shock proxy VAR, placebo

▶ Details on identification

- **Model specification:** local projections, variable selection, controls

▶ Details on specification

- **Sample period:** excluding 70s, pre-Great Recession, pre-Shale oil revolution

▶ Sub-sample analysis

⇒ Results turn out to be robust

Conclusion

- Propose a novel approach to identify **oil supply news** shocks, *combining* HFI literature with traditional oil market VARs
- Evidence for a **strong channel** operating through **supply expectations**
- Provides **new insights** to the debate on the **drivers** of **oil price** fluctuations and their **effects** on the **macroeconomy**
- Underlines the potential of the high-frequency identification approach

Thank you!

Institutional background

- **OPEC** is an intergovernmental organization of *oil producing nations*
 - Accounts for about **44%** of **world oil production**
 - Founded in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela
- Supreme authority is the **OPEC conference**, consisting of delegations headed by oil ministers of member countries
 - Meets *several times a year* to agree on **oil production plans**, including **production quotas** for the organization and its members
 - Decisions of the conference take the form of an **announcement**, issued shortly after the meeting

Institutional background

- **Crude oil** is an *internationally* traded commodity \Rightarrow **liquid futures markets**
- Most widely traded contracts: WTI crude and Brent crude futures
- Focus on **WTI crude**
 - First traded futures on crude oil, **longest history** (started trading in 1983)
 - Most *liquid* and largest volume market for crude oil (currently trading nearly 1.2 million contracts a day)
 - Relevant benchmark for the US

Surprise series: autocorrelation




Figure 11: The autocorrelation function of the oil supply surprise series

Table 2: Granger causality tests

| Variable | p-value |
|-----------------------------|---------|
| Instrument | 0.3749 |
| Oil price | 0.4846 |
| World oil production | 0.7481 |
| World oil inventories | 0.6882 |
| World industrial production | 0.9502 |
| US industrial production | 0.9342 |
| US CPI | 0.7641 |
| Fed funds rate | 0.8849 |
| S&P 500 | 0.1865 |
| NEER | 0.7282 |
| Geopolitical risk | 0.1526 |
| Joint | 0.7342 |

Surprise series: correlation with other shocks

| Shock | Source | ρ | p-value | n | Sample |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------|---------|-----|-----------------|
| <i>Panel A: Oil shocks</i> | | | | | |
| Oil price | Hamilton (2003) | 0.06 | 0.17 | 492 | 1977M01-2017M12 |
| Oil supply | Kilian (2008) | -0.05 | 0.38 | 369 | 1974M01-2004M09 |
| | Caldara et al. (2019) | -0.02 | 0.74 | 372 | 1985M01-2015M12 |
| | Baumeister and Hamilton (2019) | -0.08 | 0.09 | 515 | 1975M02-2017M12 |
| | Kilian (2009) | 0.08 | 0.09 | 395 | 1975M02-2007M12 |
| Global demand | Kilian (2009) | 0.03 | 0.51 | 395 | 1975M02-2007M12 |
| Oil-specific demand | Kilian (2009) | 0.17 | 0.00 | 395 | 1975M02-2007M12 |
| <i>Panel B: Other shocks</i> | | | | | |
| Productivity | Basu et al. (2006) | -0.04 | 0.66 | 152 | 1974Q1-2011Q4 |
| | Smets and Wouters (2007) | -0.06 | 0.50 | 124 | 1974Q1-2004Q4 |
| News | Barsky and Sims (2011) | -0.14 | 0.12 | 135 | 1974Q1-2007Q3 |
| | Kurmann and Otrok (2013) | -0.03 | 0.76 | 126 | 1974Q1-2005Q2 |
| | Beaudry and Portier (2014) | 0.04 | 0.61 | 155 | 1974Q1-2012Q3 |
| Monetary policy | Gertler and Karadi (2015) | 0.07 | 0.20 | 324 | 1990M01-2016M12 |
| | Romer and Romer (2004) | -0.00 | 0.99 | 276 | 1974M01-1996M12 |
| | Smets and Wouters (2007) | 0.04 | 0.64 | 124 | 1974Q1-2004Q4 |
| Uncertainty | Bloom (2009) | 0.01 | 0.87 | 522 | 1974M07-2017M12 |
| | Baker et al. (2016) | 0.07 | 0.15 | 390 | 1985M07-2017M12 |
| Financial | Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) | 0.02 | 0.70 | 498 | 1974M07-2015M12 |
| | Bassett et al. (2014) | 0.12 | 0.30 | 76 | 1992Q1-2010Q4 |
| Fiscal policy | Romer and Romer (2010) | 0.03 | 0.77 | 136 | 1974Q1-2007Q4 |
| | Ramey (2011) | 0.07 | 0.39 | 148 | 1974Q1-2010Q4 |
| | Fisher and Peters (2010) | 0.05 | 0.55 | 140 | 1974Q1-2008Q4 |

Table 3: Data description and sources

| Identifier | Variable name | Source |
|---------------------------|---|-----------------------|
| Instrument | | |
| NCLC.0h (PS) | WTI crude <i>h</i> th contract (settlement price) | Datastream |
| NCLC.0h (VM) | WTI crude <i>h</i> th contract (traded volume) | Datastream |
| Baseline variables | | |
| WTISPLC | WTI spot crude oil price, deflated by US CPI | FRED |
| EIA1955 | World oil production | Datastream |
| OILINV | OECD oil inventories (proxy) | Kilian & Murphy |
| OECD+6IP | IP of OECD and 6 major countries | Baumeister & Hamilton |
| INDPRO | US industrial production index | FRED |
| CPIAUCSL | US CPI for all urban consumers: all items | FRED |




Figure 12: Series included in the VAR over the sample period 1974-2015

Inflation expectations




Figure 13: Inflation expectations

- **Differential** effects between **households** and **professional forecasters**
- Response of SPF expectations **much weaker**, in line with recent literature on role of oil prices and expectations in inflation dynamics (Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Kamdar, 2018; Hasenzagl et al., 2018)

Economic activity




Figure 14: Monetary policy and financial variables

- No significant effects on **monetary policy** and **financial conditions**
- Significant fall of **stock market index**

Economic activity




Figure 15: Consumption expenditures

Background noise

- Could other shocks during the event window confound the surprise series?
 - Potentially relevant as we are using daily event window
- Formally account for background noise using heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy à la Rigobon (2003)

Background noise




Figure 16: Heteroskedasticity-based identification

Informationally robust instrument

- Do announcements **only** contain **news about future supply**?
 - For interpretation, it is *crucial* that they do **not** contain new information about **other factors**, e.g. **global oil demand**
- To mitigate this concern, construct **informationally robust** instrument, akin to Romer and Romer (2004) refinement of monetary policy shocks

Informationally robust instrument

Two steps

- Collect OPEC's **global demand forecasts** published in OPEC oil market reports
- Construct **refined instrument** as residual of the following regression

$$Surprise_m = \alpha_0 + \sum_{j=-1}^2 \theta_j F_m^{OPEC} y_{q+j} + \sum_{j=-1}^2 \varphi_j [F_m^{OPEC} y_{q+j} - F_{m-1}^{OPEC} y_{q+j}] + IRS_m$$

Informationally robust instrument





Figure 17: Refined, informationally robust surprise series

Ordinary announcements

- Large part of the OPEC meetings were **extraordinary** meetings, scheduled *in response* to macroeconomic or geopolitical developments
 - ⇒ Potential **endogeneity problem**
- As robustness, only use **ordinary** meetings

Ordinary announcements



First stage regression: F: 9.75, robust F: 4.46, R^2 : 1.86%, Adjusted R^2 : 1.67%

Figure 18: Ordinary announcements only

News and surprise shocks

- Is the instrument **only correlated** with oil supply **news shock**? Or does it also capture conventional, **unanticipated supply shocks**?
⇒ **Exogeneity assumption** might be violated
- To mitigate this concern, **identify an oil supply surprise and news shock jointly**, using Kilian's (2008) exogenous supply shock measure and my oil supply surprise series
 - **Additional identifying assumption**: oil supply news shock does **not** affect oil production **on impact**

News and surprise shocks




Figure 19: Oil supply surprise and news shocks

Futures contracts

- A crucial choice was the **maturity** of the futures contract
 - As a benchmark, used **6-month** contract
- Are results robust to using **other maturities**?

Futures contracts





Figure 20: Different maturities of futures contracts

Futures contracts

- Since the **shale oil revolution**, WTI has become less representative for the global price of oil
- Are the results robust to using **Brent** instead?

Futures contracts



First stage regression: F: 10.27, robust F: 5.56, R^2 : 1.96%, Adjusted R^2 : 1.77%

◀ Back

Figure 21: Brent spot and futures prices

Local projections




Figure 22: Local projections on shock series

Local projections





Figure 23: LP-IV using surprise series


Variable selection



First stage regression: F: 22.05, robust F: 13.63, R^2 : 4.41%, Adjusted R^2 : 4.21%

Figure 24: Kilian's (2009) global activity indicator


Variable selection



First stage regression: F: 15.19, robust F: 9.55, R^2 : 2.87%, Adjusted R^2 : 2.68%

Figure 25: Refiner acquisition costs as oil price indicator


Lag order



First stage regression: F: 20.98, robust F: 11.17, R^2 : 4.01%, Adjusted R^2 : 3.82%

Figure 26: Lag order: 24 lags


Stationary VAR



First stage regression: F: 22.89, robust F: 11.60, R^2 : 4.26%, Adjusted R^2 : 4.08%

Figure 27: Stationary VAR

Quarterly model




First stage regression: F: 10.92, robust F: 6.96, R^2 : 6.03%, Adjusted R^2 : 5.48%

◀ Back

Figure 28: Quarterly data


Sub-sample analysis: pre Great Recession



First stage regression: F: 15.79, robust F: 8.66, R^2 : 3.85%, Adjusted R^2 : 3.61%

Figure 29: Exclude Great Recession period


Sub-sample analysis: pre shale oil



First stage regression: F: 29.13, robust F: 18.65, R^2 : 6.35%, Adjusted R^2 : 6.13%

Figure 30: Exclude shale oil revolution

Sub-sample analysis: post 70s



First stage regression: F: 19.78, robust F: 11.51, R^2 : 4.55%, Adjusted R^2 : 4.32%

◀ Back

Figure 31: Exclude the 1970s